This paper compares the sources of wage growth of young workers in two countries with very different labor market institutions, the United States and Germany. It provides a precise definition of wage growth due to job search, and states the assumptions under which a lower and upper bound for wage growth due to search and firm-specific human capital accumulation can be identified. In addition, it suggests a method for wage growth due to general human capital accumulation. Despite substantially different mobility rates, the sources of wage growth are remarkably similar in both countries. General human capital accumulation is by far the most important source of wage growth. Job search accounts for at least 25 % of total wage growth. There is no evidence that returns to firm-specific human capital accumulation are higher for German apprentices than for US high school dropouts or graduates. * I would like to thank Chris Pissarides and Joseph Altonji for comments on an earlier draft of this paper. I also would like to thank Gordon Dahl, Rachana Bhatt, and seminar participants at the SED in Florence for useful comments.
The cost of job instability largely depends on the importance of firm-specific human capital, and also on the importance of job search. If workers can substantially improve their wage through job search, then there is also a large potential for loss due to involuntary job destruction 3 .
Our empirical analysis is based on the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth for the US, and a new administrative data set for Germany, the IAB-Beschäftigtenstichprobe. Both data sets cover the time period from the late seventies to the mid-nineties. They are well suited for the analysis of job mobility and wage growth. We can observe workers' entire work history from labor market entry onwards, including all job-to-job and job-to-unemployment transitions. In addition, wages can always be uniquely assigned to a job allowing the gains from switching jobs to be analyzed easily.
We conduct the empirical analysis separately for three groups of individuals with different education levels 4 . This separation allows us to test for the assumption implicitly made in standard
Mincer wage regressions that wage growth by experience is the same for all education groups. There are inherent differences in the educational systems in the two countries. In Germany, the majority of labor market entrants (about 65 %) are enrolled in an apprenticeship program. Apprentices spend four days a week in a firm, receiving training in their chosen occupation, and one day a week at state-run schools. The training period is between two and three years. Hence, the skills a typical apprentice in Germany brings to the labor market are arguably very different from those of a typical US high school graduate or dropout. Separating the analysis by education provides a preliminary analysis of the effectiveness of the German apprenticeship system, and enables us to address questions like: Are the labor market outcomes of workers with a similar educational backgrounds, such as German unskilled workers and US high school dropouts, more alike than labor market outcomes of groups with less similar backgrounds, like German apprentices and US high school graduates?
Our approach to decomposing overall wage growth into wage growth due to general and firmspecific human capital, and job search is as follows. After estimating wage growth over the life cycle net of aggregate wage growth, we obtain estimates for the returns to general human capital accumulation. The OLS estimates of experience profiles confound wage growth due to general human capital with wage growth due to job search, as more experienced workers have had more time to find a good match. We deal with this problem in a similar way as Dustmann and Meghir (2003) , by identifying returns to general human capital from the post-displacement wages of jobto-unemployment movers. The motivation behind this is that job-to-unemployment movers lose all of their search capital and have to search from scratch. Differences in the post-displacement wages of workers who became unemployed at different times during their career should thus reflect differences in general human capital.
With an estimate of wage growth due to general human capital in hand, we can then estimate the wage growth of job stayers. We are interested in measuring growth on top of what is already attributed to general human capital accumulation (and aggregate wage growth). As is well known, there are several explanations for why wages of job stayers grow. The standard explanation is firmspecific human capital accumulation. An alternative explanation is deferred compensation to deter shirking, as analyzed by Lazear (1979) 5 . A third explanation is learning about match quality, first analyzed by Jovanovic (1979a) . Suppose that firms and workers acquire new information about the quality of the match once the worker has started his job. Then jobs that turn out to be a disappointment are less likely to survive, and on average wages of job stayers rise.
This paper makes no attempt to distinguish between these alternative sources of within-job wage growth. We provide a lower bound of wage growth due to search by assuming that all within-job wage growth -in addition to wage growth due to general human capital-is due to firmspecific human capital accumulation or, alternatively, deferred compensation. In other words, we assume that there is no learning about match quality. In this case, all wage growth due to job search shows up as between-job wage growth, and we estimate this growth simply by multiplying the wage growth of job switchers (net of general human capital) with the probability of job switching, and then summing up by experience. Then, we provide an upper bound for job search by assuming that there is no firm-specific human capital accumulation, and all wage growth of stayers -in addition to general human capital accumulation-reflects learning about match quality. In this case, wage growth due to job search simply equals the difference between total wage growth (net of aggregate wage growth) and wage growth due to general human capital accumulation. An interpretation of this estimate is: This is what a worker would lose if his job ended for exogenous reasons and he had to search from scratch. This gives us an alternative way to estimate the wage loss due to an involuntary job loss.
We would like to stress that our definition for wage growth due to job search does not identify how much worse off workers would be if they were denied the option to search on-the-job. This is because the decision of an unemployed worker over which job to accept, depends on whether he can continue to search for a better job while employed or not. Identifying how much worse off workers may be without on-the-job search requires structural estimation of a search model. We leave this for future research 6 . We believe that a key advantage of our more descriptive approach is its simplicity and its transparency. Moreover, although our approach is motivated by a search model, it does not require specifying a functional form for the model.
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. General human capital is by far the most important source of wage growth for all education groups in both countries, accounting for at least 60 % of total wage growth after ten years in the labor market. Wage growth due to firm-specific human capital accumulation and/or deferred compensation is considerable for German unskilled workers, but negligible for all other education groups. Job search, in contrast, plays an important role for all education groups in both countries. Hence, the hypothesis that firm-specific human capital accumulation is a more important, and search capital a less important, contributor to wage growth for German apprentices than for US high school graduates cannot be confirmed.
German and US workers differ substantially with respect to aggregate wage growth. In the US, aggregate wage growth is positive only for university graduates, and considerably negative for high school dropouts and graduates. In Germany, in contrast, aggregate wage growth is positive and roughly similar for all education groups. This is consistent with the well-documented increase in the returns to education and experience in the US, a trend that did not occur in Germany.
A further crucial difference between the US and Germany is that total wage growth, adjusted for aggregate wage growth, is about 40 % lower for German apprentices than for American high school graduates. Here, it is important to bear in mind that apprentices have typically spent 2-3 years on training programs with the same firm before they are considered as labor market entrants.
Moreover, about two thirds stay with the training firm after training completion. Apprentices are thus likely to have accumulated a substantial amount of general, and possibly firm-specific human capital prior to labor market entry.
The life-cycle wage growth of German unskilled workers is similar to that of both US high school dropouts and graduates. However, the sources of wage growth differ. Wage growth due to general human capital accumulation is about 1/3 lower for German unskilled workers, but wage growth due to firm-specific human capital accumulation and learning about match quality is considerably higher. Wage growth due to job switching is somewhat higher for this group as well. Most interestingly, wage growth due to job switching roughly similar for German apprentices, US high school graduates and dropouts. This is true despite the fact that German workers are substantially less likely to switch jobs. The reason for this is that German workers experience 6 See e.g. Wolpin (1995, 1999) for the structural estimation of a search model.
higher wage gains from switching jobs. Our preferred explanation is based on firing costs, which are higher in Germany than in the US. Firing costs reduce the probability of becoming unemployed, and thus lower the probability that a worker loses a good match and has to search from scratch.
Accordingly, German workers are less likely to involuntarily lose accumulated search capital than their US counterparts. On the other hand, they are also less likely to move from job-to-job and allocate better job matches. In line with this hypothesis, the proportion of job-to-unemployment switches among all job switches is considerably lower in Germany than in the US. At the same time, wage gains from job switching are substantially higher for job-to-job than for job-to-unemployment movers in both countries.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the data, and Section 3 provides a first descriptive analysis.
We then define what we mean by wage growth due to job search, and state the assumptions under which we can identify wage growth due to job search as well as general and firm-specific human capital accumulation (Section 4). Section 5 presents results. We conclude with a discussion of our findings.
2 Data description and variables
German data
The data used for Germany, the IAB Beschäftigtenstichprobe, is a one percent random sample from the German Social Security Record, known as the Historical File (HF) of the Federal Employment
Office in Nuremberg. The data is available for the years 1975 to 1995. The data contains an unusually in-depth set of background information for each individual, including age, education, gender, nationality, job position, etc. Every participating firm has to report this information January 1 each year, as well as at the beginning and end of each employment relationship. The wage information available in the data set is best illustrated by an example. Consider a worker who starts a job in August and leaves the firm in February the following year. We observe his average daily wage between August and January, and January and February. This procedure guarantees that we have at least one wage observation per year for each worker.
The Historical File is supplemented by an additional data source, the Leistungsempfängerdatei, which records unemployment spells for individuals who receive unemployment benefits from the Federal Employment Office (Arbeitslosengeld and Arbeitslosenhilfe). This enables us to follow workers even through unemployment.
The data is well suited to analyze the process of job search because of its large scope. The data set contains the complete work history from labor market entry onwards up to 20 years in the labor force. Furthermore, due to the administrative nature of our data set, wages, unemployment spells, and employment spells are very accurate. In addition, wages can always be matched to a particular employer, and are never averaged across jobs. A disadvantage of the data set is that it does not cover the entire German labor force, but only employees within the social security net. This excludes the self-employed, civil servants, and workers currently doing their compulsory military service. The HF also excludes employees whose earnings fall below the threshold that makes social security contributions obligatory 7 . The data set is thus left-truncated. This does not constitute a serious problem for the sample we are using: All workers in our sample are in regular full-time employment, and are thus likely to be covered by the social security system. Moreover, as in many administrative data sets, our data is right-censored at the highest level of earnings that are subject to social security contributions. Top-coding is not a serious problem for unskilled workers and workers with an apprenticeship; for these workers less than 0.5 % of all wage observations are top-coded. For university graduates, however, the problem of top-coding is serious. For them, 10 % of all wage observations are top-coded. This proportion increases to 23 % for university graduates with ten years or more of experience. For this reason we restrict much of the empirical analysis to unskilled workers and workers with an apprenticeship.
From this data base, we select only those individuals whom we observe from their entry in the labor market onwards. For these workers experience and tenure can thus be measured accurately.
To achieve this, we require workers to be at most 15 in 1975. This is the youngest age students can leave compulsory schooling in Germany. Workers who enter the labor market with A-levels (Abitur) or a university degree are allowed to be older. See appendix A for details. Since the wage collection procedure changed in 1980, we drop observations before 1980.
For workers who completed an apprenticeship, we measure experience and tenure from completion of the program onwards. Hence, these workers have typically spent 2-3 years on training programs with the same firm. As we mentioned before this fact is important when interpreting the empirical results.
Our decomposition of wage growth into wage growth due to general human capital accumulation, firm-specific human capital accumulation, and job search is based on comparing wage observations at two points of time. We compare two wage observations which are measured one year of actual experience apart, and thus do not use all wage data available for workers who switch firms.
Appendix A describes in detail which wage observations are used for the analysis. 7 A worker who has previously paid social security contributions and now holds a job for which social sceurity contributions do not have to be paid, is included in the data set, but his wage is left-censored. A worker who has never contributed to the social security system will not be in the data.
US data
The data comes from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79). For each respondent, we construct the labor market history from the Work-History file, which contains weekly longitudinal work records. For multiple job holders, we define the main job as the job for which the worker worked the most during a given week. We only consider the main job for each respondent, and ignore other jobs. We match to this data set the educational histories of each respondent, i.e.
his current enrollment status as well as his highest grade completed.
A major problem in using the NLSY concerns the type of employment relations that should be included in our analysis. In the German data set, we only observe 'regular' employment relations, covered by the social security system. In the NLSY, on the contrary, all kinds of employment positions are reported, regardless of whether the respondent was also enrolled in school, or for how long and how many hours a week he worked at each job. Hence, counting all jobs reported in the NLSY would clearly overstate mobility in the US compared to Germany. In order to avoid this problem, we consider only those jobs that are held after a transition from school to work is made.
Such a transition is difficult to define, since working while enrolled at school is very common in the US. See appendix B for the precise definition.
Our sample is created as follows. In the NLSY, information on wages is collected as follows. During each interview, workers are asked whether they still work with the same employer they worked at the time of the last interview (i.e. typically one year ago). If so, workers are asked about the wage they earn today. If not, they are asked when they left the employer, what wage they earned when they left, when they started to work for a new employer, as well as the wage they earn at the new firm. Information on up to 5 job switches is collected. Wages are never averaged across jobs, and for each worker we have at least one wage observation per year 8 . As with the German data, we do not use all wage data available, and compare two wage observations which are measured one year of actual experience apart. Appendix B describes in detail which wage observations are used for the analysis.
Definition of variables
We next describe some of the variables used in the analysis. We define a job-to-job and job-tounemployment transition in the two data sets as follows. In the NLSY, a respondent is considered as unemployed if he is not working, but is actively looking for a job. If a respondent does not report that he was actively looking for a job between two employment spells, it is a job-to-job transition. In the German data set, a worker is unemployed if he is registered as such. Thus for Germany, a transition is a job-to-job transition if a worker has not been registered as unemployed between two employment spells.
In our sample, all workers with an apprenticeship degree are eligible for unemployment benefits.
Unskilled workers and university graduates, however, first have to accumulate work experience before they become entitled to unemployment benefits. The probability that a worker who is actively searching for a job, but not registered as unemployed, should therefore be small for apprentices, but may be substantial for unskilled workers and university graduates with little experience. For this reason, we also use an alternative definition for a job-to-unemployment transition. In this second definition, we classify a transition as a job-to-unemployment transition if the worker started the new job 4 weeks or later after his old job ended. This alternate definition differs from the original defnition in the sense that it is independent of whether the worker was actively looking for a job, or was officially registered as unemployed. This alternate definition does not qualitatively change our results.
We perform our empirical analysis separately by education. For the US, we distinguish between high school dropouts (less than 12 years of schooling), high school graduates (less then 16, but more than 12 years of schooling), and university graduates (more than 16 years of schooling). For Germany, we distinguish between unskilled workers (no completed apprenticeship), apprentices (completed apprenticeship), and university graduates (university or polytechnic degree). Precise variable definitions can be found in appendix A (German data) and B (US data). Table 1 reports the means and standard deviations of the main variables used in the analysis for the German and US data. Both data sets slightly over-sample unskilled workers and undersample university graduates. For the US, this is because we include the NLSY supplements that over-sample respondents from disadvantaged backgrounds. In the German data, this is because civil servants, who are predominantly university graduates, are not included in the data.
since the last interview (which was two years ago), we only observe one wage in two years. 
A descriptive analysis
We begin with a brief descriptive analysis of the data. We first document differences and similarities in mobility patterns between the US and Germany. We then turn to wage growth in the two countries.
3.1 Mobility 3.1.1 Number of jobs by experience Figure 1 demonstrates that mobility is substantially lower in Germany than in the US. The figure plots the average number of firms a worker has worked for by actual experience and education.
After ten years in the labor market, high school graduates in the US are employed on their 6th job on average. This is in line with Topel and Ward (1992) who find that the typical American worker holds 7 jobs in ten years. In Germany, in contrast, workers who completed an apprenticeship have worked for only 2.8 employers in ten years. It is not only apprentices who are less mobile.
There are also substantial differences between German unskilled workers and American high school graduates and dropouts, especially in later years. Using the same data set, Dustmann and Meghir 
Job survival rates
Although German workers are substantially less mobile than American workers, it is wrong to conclude that Germans do not change jobs. Figure 2 plots the empirical job survival rate for the three education groups. It is appearant that German workers are less likely to move from job-to-job as well as less likely to become unemployed than American workers, no matter which education group we consider.
Interestingly, differences in job-to-job rates between the two countries tend to be smaller than dif-ferences in job-to-unemployment transition rates. There are more interesting similarities. In both countries and for all education groups, the job-to-job and job-to-unemployment quit rate decreases with actual experience. Moreover, education has a stronger impact on the job-to-unemployment than on the job-to-job transition rate.
We have also compared the proportion of job-to-job transitions among all transitions. This proportion is higher in Germany than in the United States for all education groups, possibly because of higher firing costs in Germany 10 . In both countries the proportion of job-to-job transitions increases with experience 11 , and is higher for better educated workers.
Wage Growth
Next, we document patterns of wage growth in both countries. We begin with overall wage growth and then compare the wage growth of three groups of workers: stayers, job-to-job and job-tounemployment movers. Tables 2 and 3 report the cumulative wage growth by actual experience for Germany and the US, respectively. It is obtained by regressing the log-wage on actual experience dummies, controlling for race (US) and citizenship (Germany). The second column, as the first, includes experience dummies, but additionally conditions on year dummies. Unconditional on time effects, wage growth is similar for German apprentices and American high school graduates. Both groups experience a 50 % wage growth in ten years 12 . In the US, wage growth is considerably higher for better educated workers. In Germany, in contrast, it is the least educated workers who have the highest wage growth. Unskilled workers experience a considerably higher, while university graduates a considerably lower, wage growth in Germany than in the US. Conditioning on time effects turns out to be very important in both countries. In Germany, time effects are positive and of similar magnitude for all education groups. Thus, the coefficient on the returns to experience declines when year dummies are included in the wage regression. In the US, in contrast, time effects are negative for high school dropouts and graduates, and positive for university graduates. This is in line with the well-documented increase of returns to education in the US. The inclusion of year dummies in the wage regression results in a higher wage growth by experience for high school graduates and dropouts, and a lower one for university graduates.
Overall wage growth
Conditional on time effects, life-cycle wage growth is considerably higher for American high school graduates than for German apprentices. Here, it is important to recall that German apprentices have typically spent 2-3 years in training programs with the same firm before officially considered as labor market entrants. About two thirds stay with the training firm after training completion. Apprentices are thus likely to have accumulated a substantial amount of general and possibly firm-specific human capital prior to labor market entry. Turning to the least educated groups of workers, wage growth is considerably higher in Germany than in the US in the early years of the labor market, but lower later on. We next analyze the wage growth of three groups of workers: stayers, job-to-job and jobto-unemployment movers. For each group, we regress wage growth, measured as the difference between the log-wage in two consecutive periods, on a constant and the difference in experience squared 13 . Tables 4 and 5 report results for Germany and the US, respectively. The pattern is the same for all education groups in both countries. Stayers experience a lower wage growth than job-to-job and job-to-unemployment movers during the early years in the labor market. For all groups of workers, wage growth declines with experience. This decline is stronger in general for movers than for stayers, and particularly strong for job-to-unemployment movers 14 . This pattern is predicted by many search models.
Wage growth of stayers, job-to-job and job-to-unemployment movers
To conclude, US workers are almost twice as likely to switch firms than German workers. In both countries, wages grow substantially over the life-cycle, and workers gain considerably from switching firms. Some important questions are: Why do wages grow in the two countries? Is it section describes a simple framework that helps to disentangle the sources of wage growth. It is important to stress that our decomposition into the three sources of wage growth is done by actual experience, and not potential experience. We therefore do not take into account time spent in unemployment and out of the labor force. This should not seriously affect the comparison between the US and Germany, as the distribution of actual experience, given potential experience, is very similar in the two countries.
A framework to identify wage growth due to job search and human capital
This section lays out a simple framework for identifying wage growth due to job search and human capital accumulation. We have in mind a search model with on-the-job search in the spirit of Burdett (1978) , Jovanovic (1979a Jovanovic ( , 1984 and Mortensen (1988) . Workers either work or are unemployed. Their productivity differs across firms. This may be because of match-specific productivity:
Workers with the same ability in the same firm earn different wages because some workers are better matched with the firm -and are thus more productive-than others. Alternatively a different productivity of workers across firms may reflect firm quality. This paper makes no attempt to distinguish between these two cases. Workers do not know the location of the firm where they are most productive, and are continually searching for a good match, both on-and off-the-job.
Unemployed workers accept a job offer if the value of the job exceeds the value of unemployment.
Employed workers accept an outside offer if the value of the new job exceeds the value of the old job. On-the-job search thus leads to endogenous job-to-job transitions and allows workers to allocate better matches over time.
We also suppose that productivity is subject to shocks. This allows firms and workers to receive new information about the quality of the match as workers 'experience' the job, as in Jovanovic (1979a) . Alternatively, a change in the quality of the match may be thought of as firmlevel productivity shocks that affect wages. Again, this paper makes no attempt to distinguish between these two cases. The presence of productivity shocks thus leads to endogenous job-tounemployment transitions: A match that used to be preferable to unemployment before may no longer be preferable after disappointing news about the match arrived.
In such framework, it is still dispuTable how wages are determined, as firms do not need to pay wages equal to productivity in order to attract workers. We do not add to this literature, and simply assume that log-wages linearly depend on firm-specific human capital as well as on match quality. We believe this approach is justified given that the focus of this paper is. the decomposition of total wage growth into wage growth due to human capital and job search, and not wage determination 15 . Suppose that the log-wage of worker i in firm j at calender time t can be written as
where e and τ denote actual experience and firm tenure, respectively. General and firm-specific human capital accumulation are represented by α(e it ) and β(τ ijt ). Alternatively, β(τ ) may reflect
wage growth by tenure due to deferred compensation, as in Lazear (1979) or Salop and Salop (1976) 16 . Note that all workers accumulate the same amount of general and firm-specific human capital 17 . The time effect γ t captures aggregate wage growth. Suppose the error term u ijt can be decomposed as
where f i is a fixed worker effect, representing workers' time-invariant ability that is equally valued at all firms; m ij (τ ) denotes the expected quality of the match; and e ijt is an i.i.d. wage shock, representing for instance measurement error. Match quality depends on tenure τ as it may change over time even for workers who do not switch firms. We call this "learning about match quality", but as explained earlier, it may alternatively reflect shocks to firm productivity. We do not impose some a priori restrictions on the time series properties of m. In addition to aggregate wage growth, 15 In a recent paper, Woodcock (2003) shows that in a model with learning about match quality and Nash bargaining, but without on-the-job search, equilibrium wages are linear in a person-specific component, firm-specific component, and the posterior mean of beliefs about match quality. Moscarini (2003) allows for on-the-job search.
In this case, such a simple decomposition breaks down. 16 In these cases, workers' wage rises with tenure altough workers' productivity does not. This paper makes no attempt to distinguish between alternative explanations for returns to tenure. 17 Also note that firm-specific human capital accumulation does not depend on the quality of the match. Jovanovic (1979b) presents a model in which workers invest more in firm-specific human capital accumulation the better their match.
there are three sources of wage growth implied by the two equations. First, wages grow because of general human capital accumulation, α(e). Second, wages grow because of firm-specific human capital accumulation or deferred compensation, β(τ ). The return to both general and firm-specific human capital accumulation is assumed to be the same across workers and firms. Third, wages grow because of on-the-job search: With time in the labor market, workers allocate better matches.
This effect is captured by the term m ij (τ ).
In what follows, we attempt to quantify the three different sources of wage growth for German and American workers. That is, we are interested in how much of the wage growth after e years in the labor market can be attributed to general human capital accumulation, to firm-specific human capital accumulation and to job search. We first provide a definition for wage growth due to on-the-job search. We then discuss how to estimate wage growth due to general and firm-specific human capital.
Before doing so, it is useful to discuss what affects workers' decisions to switch jobs. An important determinant of job mobility is the quality of the match: Workers are more likely to become unemployed and move from job-to-job for the following reasons: a low match quality at the current firm, a large negative shocks to match quality, and a large match quality at the outside firm. Job mobility may also depend on job tenure through firm-specific human capital accumulation or learning about match quality. If workers accumulate general human capital faster when young than when old, job-to-unemployment mobility will also depend on experience (e.g.
Topel (1986))
. What is discussed less frequently in the literature is how ability affects mobility.
Suppose that the gap between productivity and the opportunity cost of working is increasing in ability. Then, as Moscarini (2003) and Woodcock (2003) point out, high ability workers are more likely to leave unemployment and less likely to quit into unemployment 18 .
Defining wage growth due to job search and firm-specific human capital accumulation
We begin with a comparison of the wage growth of stayers, job-to-job and job-to-unemployment movers. Taking the difference of (1) for those who stay with the firm yields
Clearly, the fixed worker effect drops out of this first-difference equation. Suppose that transitory wage shocks do not affect workers' decision to move. This is the case if the shocks purely reflect measurement error. It is also a reasonable assumption if workers are not credit constrained, and thus able to insure against transitory income shocks. The the average wage growth of stayers with tenure τ equals:
Similarly, the average wage growth of workers with tenure τ − 1 last period who move from jobto-job (jtj) and job-to-unemployment (jtu) equals:
, and
The average wage growth of stayers, job-to-job and job-to-unemployment movers have two common components, wage growth due to general human capital, ∆α(e), and aggregate wage growth, ∆γ t . Wage growth for stayers additionally reflects wage growth due to firm-specific human capital accumulation or deferred compensation, ∆β(τ ); as well as the change in the quality of the match,
. We expect the latter term to be positive, as workers who receive a higher wage shock should be more likely to stay. According to most search models, job-to-job movers lose their firm-specific human capital, but improve the quality of their match. Job-to-unemployment movers, in contrast, do not only lose their firm-specific human capital, but may also become worse matched at the new job 19 .
How can we define wage growth due to just job search? Suppose first that there is no ex ante heterogeneity in mobility rates, i.e. ability does not affect mobility. A natural way to define wage growth due to search, for a worker with tenure τ − 1 at the old job, is:
Wage growth due to search = Pr(stay)E[∆m ij (τ )|stay]
This is the average improvement in the quality of the match from one experience level to the next.
It is important to realize that it is not only workers who move (from job-to-job) that allocate better matches. With learning about match quality, part of the increase in search capital shows 19 Note, however, that it is also the workers who are badly matched who are more likely to become unemployed.
The next time they find employment they may be more lucky in drawing a good match. Job-to-unemployment movers may thus experience a higher wage growth than stayers.
up as within-job wage growth, the search capital of stayers increases (see also Jovanovic (1984) ) 20 .
Wage growth due to job search thus consists of three parts. First, the expected match quality of stayers may improve since matches that turn out to be a disappointment are destroyed. Second, the expected match quality of job-to-job movers typically increases since a move occurs only if the value of the new job exceeds the value of the old job, taking into account the loss in firmspecific human capital. Third, job-to-unemployment movers may lose search capital in addition to firm-specific human capital. In order to obtain wage growth due to search by (actual) experience, unconditional on tenure, we then have to average over the tenure distribution by experience. For instance, for a worker who has just entered the labor market, wage growth due to job search in the first year equals
Wage growth due to search = Pr(stay)
This is the wage growth a job market entrant can expect after one year due to optimal job search.
Why is this an appropriate measure of wage growth due to job search? In the absence of ex ante heterogeneity in mobility rates, it is ex ante random who will draw a good match, and therefore it is random who leaves the firm and who stays. Of course, ex post the mobility decision is endogenous:
it is the better matched workers who are less likely to leave. This argument breaks down if there is ex ante heterogeneity in mobility rates. If ability affects mobility, then gains from job mobility may differ for low and high ability workers, even if ability is modeled as a fixed effect and drops out of the wage growth equation. In this case, one would like to identify the wage growth due to job search of a randomly selected worker. We come back to this point in section 5.5.
It is also important to remember that this definition for wage growth due to job search does not identify how much worse off workers would be if they were denied the option to search on-the-job.
Clearly, workers' decisions over which job to accept while unemployed depend on whether workers can search on-the-job or not. Hence, estimating workers' gain in life-time utility from on-the-job search requires structural estimation of a search model. We leave this for future research.
How can we define wage growth due to firm-specific human capital accumulation over the lifecycle? A natural way to define wage growth due to search, for a worker with tenure τ − 1 at the old job, is:
wage growth due to firm-specific human capital = P r(stay)∆β(τ ) − Pr(move)β(τ − 1). 20 In Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002), wage growth due to job search also shows up partly as within-job wage growth, although producitvity does not change over time. Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) allow firms to respond to outside offers. Hence, if a worker meets a firm that is willing to pay a higher wage than the one she currently earns, but her productivity at the outside firm is lower than at her current firm, she stays with the employer and receives a wage increase.
Again, it is important to distinguish between stayers and movers. Wages of stayers grow by ∆β(τ ) due to firm-specific human capital accumulation. Wages of movers, in contrast, decline by β(τ −1), as they lose the stock of human capital when switching employers. In order to obtain wage growth just due to firm-specific human capital accumulation by (actual) experience, unconditional on tenure, we have to average over the tenure distribution by experience.
Note that our definition for wage growth due to firm-specific human capital accumulation differs from the usual interpretation of returns to tenure. Our definition does not measure how much a worker can expect his wage to grow with tenure at the same firm relative to his outside option. Instead, it measures how much a labor market entrant can expect his wage to grow due to firm-specific human capital accumulation with time in the labor market.
Estimation of wage growth due to job search
How can we estimate wage growth due to just job search, using our defnition? Suppose we have estimates for aggregate wage growth and wage growth due to general human capital. Estimating wage growth due to job search then boils down to disentangling wage growth due to firm-specific human capital accumulation (or deferred compensation) and learning about match quality, for workers who stay with their employer. This paper makes no attempt to distinguish between these alternative sources of within-job wage growth. Instead, we first assume that all within-job wage growth (on top of wage growth due to general human capital accumulation and aggregate time effects) is due to firm-specific human capital accumulation. In other words, there is no learning about match quality and all wage growth due to job search shows up in the wage growth of movers.
This provides a lower bound for wage growth due to job search, as long as E[∆m ij (τ )|stay] > 0 and β(τ − 1) > 0. We compute this lower bound as follows. Let b α(e) and b γ t denote the estimates for the return to general human capital and aggregate wage growth. For each wage observation, we first subtract b α(e) and b γ, i.e.
where e ε ijt = ε ijt + γ t − b γ t + α(e) − b α(e). We then compute the average (log-) wage growth for workers who switch jobs. For workers with tenure τ − 1 at their old job, this equals
For each experience level e, the lower bound for wage growth due to job search is the expected probability of moving multiplied by the average adjusted wage growth for job movers, i.e. This is what a worker would lose if his job ended for purely exogenous reasons and he had to search from scratch. Such a worker does not only lose his firm-specific human capital, but also his search capital.
Estimation of wage growth due to firm-specific human capital accumulation
Before we outline our identification strategy for estimating returns to general human capital accumulation, we discuss the estimation of firm-specific human capital accumulation and deferred compensation. As for movers, we can compute the wage growth of stayers, adjusted for aggregate wage growth and wage growth due to general human capital accumulation, as follows.
As we discussed above, it reflects not only wage growth due to firm-specific human capital accumulation and deferred compensation, ∆β(τ ), but also wage growth due to learning about match quality, E[∆m ij (τ )|stay]. Moreover, it does not take into account the loss in firm-specific human capital for workers who switch jobs. It thus provides an upper bound for wage growth due to firm-specific human capital accumulation over the life cycle. The cumulative log-wage growth due to firm-specific human capital accumulation and learning about match quality can be computed as:
wage growth due to firm-specific human capital and learning = E X e=1 Pr(stay) e E e [∆ ln e w ijt |stay].
Identifying returns to general human capital accumulation
Next, we discuss the estimation of the return to general human capital accumulation, α(e). As mentioned earlier, estimating (1) by OLS, controlling for job tenure, yields an upward estimate of α(e) for at least two reasons. First, Cov(e, m ij (τ )) 6 = 0 : Workers allocate better job matches with time in the labor market. Second, Cov(e, f i ) 6 = 0 : More able workers may become unemployed less often and thus have more actual experience. Our approach to overcome these problems closely follows Dustmann and Meghir (2003) . We use post-displacement wages of job-to-unemployment movers to identify returns to general human capital accumulation. The idea is that job-to-unemployment movers have to search from scratch, thus mitigating the problem of a positive correlation between experience and match quality. We next discuss some problems of this strategy.
Correlation between experience and match quality Using job-to-unemployment movers fully eliminates the correlation between actual experience and match quality only if the search problem of an unemployed worker does not depend on actual experience. This may be violated for several reasons. First, suppose that human capital accumulation is concave and workers acquire skills faster when young than when old. Since workers only acquire skills when employed, younger workers require a lower level of match quality in order to accept the job. The average quality of the match at the post-displacement job is therefore higher for older workers, leading to an upward bias in the return to general human capital accumulation.
Second, the search problem of older workers may be different from that of younger workers because of unemployment benefits. On one hand, young workers may not be entitled to unemployment benefits, making them more likely to accept matches of lower quality than older workers.
This again leads to an upward bias in the returns to general human capital accumulation. On the other hand, suppose that unemployment benefits do not depend on experience. Since productivity increases with experience, the opportunity cost of declining a wage offer increases with experience.
More experienced workers are thus less choosy, leading to a downward bias in the returns to general human capital. This argument continues to hold if the unemployment benefit increases with experience at a lower rate than productivity. This is likely to be the case, as in both countries the unemployment benefit is equal to a fraction of workers' previous wage. These biases may cancel out, and overall, we expect the bias to be small.
Job-to-unemployment movers and ability Another potential problem with using job-tounemployment movers is that returns to general human capital are identified from a selected sample:
Job-to-unemployment movers may be less able on average than randomly selected workers. This is the main reason why Dustmann and Meghir (2003) use post-displacement wages of workers who specifically lost their job because of a plant closure to identify returns to general human capital.
The idea is that a plant closure is a random event, so that workers displaced due to plant closures represent a sample of truly exogenous movers, with an ability equal to the average ability in the economy 21 . The structure of the US data does not allow us to pursue this strategy.
The presumed lower ability of job-to-unemployment movers is a serious problem if returns to human capital accumulation is heterogenous, i.e. if more able workers accumulate more general human capital. In this case, the estimate for the returns to general human capital accumulation of the average worker is clearly downward biased. In order to investigate whether this is a serious problem, we examine the covariance structure of residuals from a wage growth regression. Results can be found in Table 16 in Appendix C. If more able workers accumulate more human capital, then past wage growth is a predictor for future wage growth. Hence, the residuals from a growth regression should be positively correlated, at least at higher lags. In line with results reported in the literature 22 , we find no evidence for a positive correlation. This suggests that heterogeneity in the rate of human capital accumulation is not a serious problem.
Even with homogeneous accumulation of human capital, job-to-unemployment movers who have lower ability remain a problem if the average ability of workers who become unemployed early differs from the average ability of workers who become unemployed later. Topel (1991) argues that this will typically lead to a downward bias in the returns to general human capital. In order to get an idea whether this is a potential problem, we include the number of jobs a worker held before he became unemployed into the regression as a proxy for workers' ability. The idea is again that unemployed workers have to search from scratch. Hence, a lower post employment wage for frequent job switchers is likely to reflect lower ability, as opposed to lower match quality.
Controlling for the number of prior job switches gives an unbiased estimate if the covariance between experience and ability, conditional on the number of jobs, Cov(e, f | # jobs) = 0, is zero. In contrast, if Cov(e, f | # jobs) > 0, the estimate for the returns to general human capital accumulation will be upward biased. This is likely to be the case: A worker who has switched jobs twice during one year is likely to be less able than a worker who has switched jobs twice during five years 23 . 21 Workers who lose their job because of plant closure may still be negatively selected, as it is small firms who are more likely to close down, and less able workers may sort into smaller firms. Dustmann and Meghir (2003) deal with a possible correlation between ability and actual experience as well as with the selection of unemployed workers into work by using age as an instrument. We decided not to pursue this strategy, as age may not be a valid exclusion restriction. This is because in a search model, any variable that affects workers' participation and mobility decision necessarily affects workers' wage, too.
Results
We begin by documenting wage growth net of aggregate wage growth. We then estimate returns to general human capital. We finally provide a lower and upper bound for wage growth due to search and firm-specific human capital accumulation. We would like to remind the reader that our decomposition into the three sources of wage growth is done by actual experience, and not potential experience. We therefore do not take into account time spent in unemployment and out of the labor force. Separate regressions for each education group. Regressions in column 1 are based on log-wage levels, and control for nationality, actual experience dummies, and time dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. Regressions in column 2 are based log-wage differences. Time effects are preestimated by OLS from a wage level regression. Time effects are preestimated by OLS from a wage level regression. Standard errors are computed by the block-bootstrap procedure, using 1000 repititions.
Total wage growth
We first estimate wage growth by actual experience, adjusted for aggregate wage growth. This requires disentangling time effects from experience effects. Neither data is ideally suited for this, due to a strong positive correlation between experience and time 24 . Yet, it is very important to control for time effects, as Tables 2 and 3 in Section 3 demonstrated. Despite these drawbacks, we would like to stress that our data is the best data currently available to analyze mobility and wage growth.
One problem of estimating wage growth by actual experience from a wage level regression is that actual experience may be correlated with the fixed worker effect in the error term: More able workers may be less likely to become unemployed and thus have more actual experience, leading to an upward bias ('ability bias'). We therefore estimate wage growth by actual experience from a first difference equation, which cancels out the fixed worker effect. We pre-estimate time effects by OLS from a wage level regression, and subtract the estimated time effect for each wage observation:
where e e ε ijt = ε ijt + (b γ t − γ t ). We then compute adjusted wage growth, ∆ ln e e w ijt , and regress it on the differenced actual experience dummies. Hence, we do not impose a functional form on the experience profile. Adjusted wage growth may be written as:
∆ ln e e w ijt = ∆α(e) + Pr(stay)∆β(τ ) − Pr(move)β(τ − 1) +
The experience dummies thus up wage growth due to general human capital accumulation, ∆α(e);
firm-specific human capital accumulation and deferred compensation, Pr(stay)∆β(τ )−Pr(move)β(τ − 1), as well as changes in the quality of the match for those who stay and move. Column 2 of Tables   6 and 7 report results for Germany and the United States, respectively. For comparison, column 1 shows the results based on wage levels from Tables 2 and 3 . Due to wage censoring, we do not report results for university graduates in Germany. For the US, the results are roughly similar to, and not statistically different from, those based on wage levels. For Germany, in contrast, estimates based on first differences are significantly lower at higher experience levels. The ability bias in returns to experience thus appears to be stronger in Germany than in the US.
Otherwise, the conclusion drawn from the first difference regressions are the same as from the wage level regression. In Germany, wage growth is considerably higher for unskilled workers than for apprentices, which may be a result of the extra 2-3 years of experience apprentices have upon labor market entry. In the US, in contrast, it is the better educated workers who enjoy a higher wage growth. Except in the first year, wage growth of German apprentices is substantially smaller than that of both American high school dropouts and graduates. German unskilled workers experience a higher wage growth than American high school graduates and dropouts early in the labor market, but a smaller wage growth later on.
We conducted a number of robustness checks. One possible concern with pre-estimating time effects by OLS using wage levels is that they may be biased due to the correlation between time and fixed worker effect. In survey data like the NLSY, this may arise because of sample attrition:
Workers with lower earning power may be more likely to drop out of the survey 25 . For this As a further robustness check, we also instrumented actual experience by potential experience in a wage level regression. Here, we have assumed a functional form for wage growth by experience, a polynomial of order 3. Results (not reported) tend to be somewhat higher for all education groups at higher experience levels, but not substantially so. Instrumenting time effects by deviations from their individual mean has little impact on the results. Finally, we also estimated time and experience effects simultaneously in a difference regression, assuming a cubic in experience. Results
(not reported) are also very similar 26 .
Wage growth due to general human capital accumulation
In the next step, we estimate returns to general human capital accumulation. We specify general human capital accumulation as a polynomial of order 3. We experimented with different functional forms, but overall, the results show little sensitivity to the form used 27 . As described in section 4.4, we identify returns to general experience from the post-displacement wages of job-to-unemployment movers. We include time effects, citizenship (Germany), and race (United States) as additional controls 28 . We use the first definition of unemployment, but results are very similar when the second definition is used. Separate regressions for each education group. Regressions in the first and second set of columns are based on wages following a job-to-unemployment transition. Regressions in the third set of columns are based on wages following a job-to-job as well as a job-to-unemployment transition. Column 1 controls for nationality, actual experience, actual experience squared and cubed, and time dummies. Column 2 and 3 addionally control for the number of prior job-to-job and job-to-unemployment transitions. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
For each education group, column 1 of Tables 8 and 9 report the estimated coefficients as well as the cumulative log-wage return due to general human capital accumulation. In Germany, returns to human capital accumulation are roughly the same for unskilled workers and apprentices, and somewhat higher for university graduates. For instance, an apprentice can expect his wage to grow due to general human capital accumulation by about 17.0 % in five years and 24.9 % in 10 years, compared to 20 % and 32.3 % for a university graduate 29 . In the US, returns to general human capital accumulation are higher, and similar across education groups. A US high school graduate can expect his wage to grow because of general human capital accumulation by 29.2 % in 5 years and 38.2 % in ten years 30 .
These estimates may be biased, as they are identified from a selected sample. A mentioned before, more able workers may be less likely to become unemployed, thus inducing a correlation between experience and the fixed worker effect. In order to assess this problem, we include the number of prior job-to-job and job-to-unemployment switches, which act as a proxy for workers' ability, into the wage regression. As discussed in section 4.4, this inclusion is likely to yield an upward bias in the return to general human capital, as experience and ability are likely to be positively correlated among job-to-unemployment movers, conditional on the number of prior job switches. For each education group, column 2 of Tables 8 and 9 show the results of this inclusion.
In Germany, the number of prior job-to-job and job-to-unemployment switches negatively affect post-displacement wages of job-to-unemployment movers. This indicates that more able workers are not only less likely to become unemployed, but are also less likely to move from job-to-job.
The inclusion of job-to-job and job-to-unemployment transitions leads to higher returns to general human capital accumulation for all education groups, particularly for university graduates. This is also the group of workers for whom the number of prior job switches has the strongest negative effect on post-displacement wages.
In the US, in contrast, it is only the number of prior job-to-unemployment switches that negatively affects post-displacement wages of job-to-unemployment movers. The inclusion of prior job switches has little impact on the returns to general human capital accumulation for high school 29 These results are somewhat lower than Dustmann and Meghir 's (2003) results. The most important difference between our and their methodology is that they use post-displacement wages of workers who lost their job because of plant closure, instead of job-to-unemployment movers, in order to identify returns to general human capital accumulation. Our results are close to theirs when we use this strategy, despite differences in the functional form.
The reason why Dustmann and Meghir (2003) use workers displaced by plant closure is that these workers possibly represent, unlike job-to-unemployment movers, exogenous movers, so that experience is uncorrelated with the fixed effect in the post-displacement wage regression. This could explain Dustmann and Meghir's higher estimates. There is, however, an alternative explanation. Dustmann and Meghir classify a worker as displaced due to plant closure if the plant closes down within a year of his departure. Some of these workers may in fact be voluntary movers. It is therefore likely that for displaced workers -more than for job-to-unemployment movers-experience is correlated with match quality at the new job, leading to an upward bias in the returns to general human capital accumulation. 30 These results are roughly in line with Topel (1991) who find that for all education groups, the cumulative logwage return due to experience is 26 % after 5 years and 41 % after ten years (own calculations based on estimates   from table 2, column 3 and table 3 ). Altonji and Williams (1997) report similar results. Separate regressions for each education group. Regressions in the first and second set of columns are based on wages following a job-to-unemployment transition. Regressions in the third set of columns are based on wages following a job-to-job as well as a job-to-unemployment transition. Column 1 controls for race, actual experience, actual experience squared and cubed, and time dummies. Column 2 and 3 addionally control for the number of prior job-to-job and job-to-unemployment transitions. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
dropouts and graduates. For university graduates, in contrast, returns to general human capital accumulation increase. As in Germany, this is the group for whom the number of prior job-tounemployment switches has the strongest negative impact. This suggest that our estimates for the returns to general human capital accumulation in column 1 are possibly downward biased, in particular in Germany.
For comparison, the third columns of Tables 8 and 9 report estimates using all new jobs, that is jobs following both a job-to-job and job-to-unemployment transition. As argued by Topel (1991), these estimates are likely to be upward biased, since job-to-job movers accept the new offer when it pays a higher wage. This induces a positive correlation between experience and match quality. In both countries and for all education groups, estimates using all new jobs exceed those using only jobs following a job-to-unemployment transition. The difference is most striking for US university graduates. We interpret this as evidence that job search plays an important role for all education groups.
5.3 Wage growth due to job search and firm-specific human capital accumulation Next, we estimate wage growth due to job search and firm-specific human capital accumulation.
We first provide the lower bound for wage growth due to job search. For each wage observation, we subtract the estimated time effect as well as the estimated wage growth due to general human capital:
where
We then compute the lower bound for the cumulative log-wage growth due to job search as:
wage growth due to search, lower bound =
The wage growth of job stayers, adjusted for aggregate wage growth and wage growth due to general human capital accumulation, is computed similarly as:
As discussed, it reflects both wage growth due to firm-specific human capital accumulation and learning about match quality. Table 10 and Table 11 report results for Germany and the US, respectively. The Tables also   show total wage growth, using estimates from Tables 6 and 7 , and wage growth due to general human capital accumulation, using estimates from Tables 8 and 9 , column 1.
For German unskilled workers, 35 % of total wage growth in the first year can be attributed to firm-specific human capital accumulation, deferred compensation and learning about match quality. This proportion reduces to 29 % and 20 % by the 5th and 10th year. For all other education groups, this type of wage growth is negligible, and often negative. This negative effect is somewhat surprising 31 . A possible reason could be that our estimate for general human capital 31 It contrasts with Topel's (1991) finding of substantial returns to tenure, almost 30% for 10 years of tenure.
However, earlier research by Altonji and Shakotko (1987) and Abraham and Farber (1987) found considerably smaller returns to tenure. Moreover, Topel's results were later challenged by Altonji and Williams (1997) who, using the same data, find considerably smaller returns to tenure. Our finding that wage growth by tenure plays only a limited role is in line Barlevy (2003) who finds very small returns to tenure using NLSY data. Column 1 displays total wage growth from colum 2, Table 6 . Column 2 displays wage growth due to general human capital accumulation, from the first set of columns in Table 8 . Column 3 shows wage growth due to job switching, computed as the product of the probability of job switching and the wage growth, net of aggregate wage growth and wage growth due to general human capital, of job switchers. Column 4 shows wage growth due to firm-specific human capital accumulation and learning about match quality, computed as the product of the probability of staying and the adjusted wage growth of job stayers. Standard errors are computed the block-bootstrap procedure, using 1000 repititions.
is upward biased. This however, seems unlikely, as our estimate is more likely to be downward biased. It thus seems safe to conclude that firm-specific human capital accumulation, deferred compensation, and learning about match quality contribute little to overall wage growth for these young workers. The hypothesis that firm-specific human capital accumulation is a more important contributor to wage growth for German apprentices than for American high school dropouts and graduates thus cannot be confirmed.
Wage growth due to general human capital accumulation, in contrast, is an important contributor to total wage growth for all education groups in both countries. After ten years in the labor market, general human capital accumulation accounts for at least 60 % of total wage growth for any education group, and is thus the most important source of wage growth.
As with wage growth due to general human capital accumulation, wage growth due to job switching is also substantial for all education groups in both countries. It is most important during the first year in the labor market, explaining 25-35 % of the overall wage growth for that year. After 10 years in the labor market, it varies from about 20 % (US high school graduates) to about 30 % (American university graduates).
In the US, wage growth due to job switching matters most for university graduates. Recall that this is the same group for whom using starting wages of job-to-unemployment movers, rather than starting wages of all movers, has the strongest impact on the returns to general human capital (Table 9) . One explanation for this is the following. Suppose that, as in Moscarini (2003) , the difference between productivity and the opportunity cost of working is higher for better educated workers. This implies that better educated workers are willing to accept relatively lower match qualities, and thus leave unemployment faster. Consequently, they accumulate more search capital.
In line with this hypothesis, university graduates are substantially less likely to become unemployed than high school dropouts and graduates (Figure 3) , and also experience a shorter unemployment duration 32 .
Turning to Germany, it is unskilled workers who enjoy a higher wage growth due to job switching (absolutely, but not proportionally) than workers who complete an apprenticeship. One explanation for this, as hypothesized for instance by Neal (1998) , is that the apprenticeship system hinders job mobility, as it provides workers with firm-specific skills. If true, we should observe positive wage growth due to firm-specific human capital accumulation for apprentices. An alternative explanation is that a larger fraction of apprentices have already found a good match upon apprenticeship completion, leaving less room for wage growth due to search. According to this explanation, unskilled workers simply 'catch up' with apprentices. In order to investigate this hypothesis, we repeated the empirical analysis for apprentices who experienced an unemployment Column 1 displays total wage growth from colum 2, Table 6 . Column 2 displays wage growth due to general human capital accumulation, from the first set of columns in Table 8 . Column 3 shows wage growth due to job switching, computed as the product of the probability of job switching and the wage growth, net of aggregate wage growth and wage growth due to general human capital, of job switchers. Column 4 shows wage growth due to firm-specific human capital accumulation and learning about match quality, computed as the product of the probability of staying and the adjusted wage growth of job stayers. Standard errors are computed by the block-bootstrap procedure, using 1000 repititions.
spell after apprenticeship training, and thus had to search again for a good match. This is the case for about 15 % of all apprentices, and roughly half of those that leave their training firm. These workers indeed enjoy a higher wage growth (0.38 vs. 0.33 after ten years). Interestingly, wage growth due to job switching increases from 0.08 to 0.12 after ten years. This supports of the above hypothesis, but cannot explain the entire differences between unskilled workers and apprentices 33 .
It is also of interest to compare wage growth due to job switching in the US and Germany.
Interestingly, this amount is highest for German unskilled workers. It is roughly similar for apprentices and US high school graduates, despite lower mobility in Germany. One explanation for this is that German workers face larger mobility costs, which not only reduces the probability of moving, but also increases the gain from switching jobs. An alternative explanation is based on firing costs, which are substantially higher in Germany than in the US. Firing costs should reduce the probability of becoming unemployed, and thus lower the probability that a worker loses a good match and has search from scratch. According to this explanation, German workers are less likely to move from job-to-job and allocate a better job match than their US counterparts, but they are also less likely to involuntarily lose accumulated search capital. In line with this hypothesis, the proportion of job-to-unemployment switches among all job switches is considerably lower in Germany than in the US. At the same time, wage gains from job switching are considerably higher for job-to-job than for job-to-unemployment movers in both countries.
An alternative estimate for wage growth due to job search
As we have argued, the estimates for wage growth due to job switching provides a lower bound for wage growth due to job search. We can obtain an upper bound for wage growth due to job search by adding up wage growth due to job switching and wage growth due to firm-specific human capital accumulation and learning. Alternatively, it can be obtained by subtracting wage growth due to general human capital from overall wage growth. Since our estimates for the return to general human capital are possibly downward biased, this is indeed an upper bound. Before we comment on the results, we next discuss an alternative estimate for wage growth due to job search.
A disadvantage of our approach is that the estimation of wage growth due to job search relies on estimates for aggregate wage growth and returns to general human capital accumulation. As a robustness check, we provide an alternative estimate for wage growth due to job search that does not require reliance on such estimates. This estimate makes use of the fact that wage growth of stayers and movers have two common components, aggregate wage growth and wage growth due 33 Here, it is also important to bear in mind that unlike unskilled labor market entrants, apprentices are entitled to generous unemployment benefits after apprenticeship completion. Apprentices may thus turn down matches that unskilled workers are willing to accept. bound' of of wage growth due to job search, computed as the difference between total wage growth and the sum of aggregate wage growth and wage growth due to general human capital accumulation. Column 2 provides an alternative estimate for wage growth due to job search, computed as the product of the probability of moving and the difference between wage growth of movers and stayers. Standard erros are computed by the block-bootstrap procedure, using 1000 repititions.
to general human capital. The estimate is based on the comparison of the wage growth of movers and stayers:
Suppose that, as our lower bound for search capital assumes, E e [∆m ij (τ )|stay] = 0. Using the alternative estimate, wage growth due to job search becomes
It differs from our lower bound as the current stock of firm-specific human capital, rather than the lagged stock of firm-specific human capital, is subtracted. Hence, this alternative estimate for wage growth due to job search again yields a lower bound for wage growth due to job search. Tables 12 and 13 display the results, and compare them with our upper bound for wage growth due to job search. With the exception of German unskilled workers, estimates from the 'lower' and 'upper' bound are not too different at lower experience levels. This is not surprising given our finding that firm-specific human capital and learning about match quality each play only a minor role in wage growth. Our 'lower' bound sometimes exceeds the 'upper' bound for wage growth bound' of of wage growth due to job search, computed as the difference between total wage growth and the sum of aggregate wage growth and wage growth due to general human capital accumulation. Column 2 provides an alternative estimate for wage growth due to job search, computed as the product of the probability of moving and the difference between wage growth of movers and stayers. Standard erros are computed using the bootstrap procedure, allowing for clustering at the indiviual level.
due to job search. This is because wage growth of stayers, adjusted for aggregate wage growth and wage growth due to general human capital accumulation, can be negative at some experience levels. In this case, the upper bound for wage growth due to job search is still an upper bound, as long as we are willing to believe that wage growth due to firm-specific human capital accumulation is positive. The lower bound, in contrast, is no longer a lower bound if either wage growth due to firm-specific human capital or learning about match quality is negative. Overall our results are robust to alternative ways of estimating wage growth due to search.
Ex ante heterogeneity in mobility rates
Our method for estimating wage growth due to job search assumes that conditional on education, there is no ex ante heterogeneity in mobility rates. Tables 8 and 9 illustrate that this assumption may be violated. In both countries, the number of prior job-to-unemployment transitions negatively affects post-displacement wages of job-to-unemployment movers. Interestingly, in both countries this effect is particularly strong for university graduates. This suggests that less able workers are more likely to become unemployed, in particular among college graduates. In Germany, it is also the number of prior job-to-job switches that negatively affect post-displacement wages of job-to-unemployment movers, indicating that job-to-job movers are of lower ability too.
How does ex ante heterogeneity in mobility rates affect estimation of search capital? First note that with ex ante heterogeneity, wage growth due to search will differ for workers with different ability. In this case, we would ideally like to identify wage growth due to search for the average worker. A comparison between education groups may provide some clues for how ex ante heterogeneity affects our estimate of wage growth due to search. In the US, it is university graduates who are the least likely to move, and who accumulate the most search capital. This is in line with Moscarini's (2003) search model. Suppose that the mean of the productivity distribution is higher for better educated workers, but the variance of that distribution and the unemployment benefits (or the opportunity costs of working) do not depend on workers' education. This implies that better educated workers leave unemployment faster since they are willing to accept relatively lower match qualities. Consequently, they will accumulate more search capital. This argument suggests that our estimate for wage growth due to job search for the average worker is upward biased. In this case, our upper bound for wage growth due to search would still be an upper bound.
This story may not hold in Germany, as less able workers are not only more likely to become unemployed, but also less likely to move from job-to-job. Hence, in Germany, our estimate for wage growth due to job search for the average worker is possibly downward biased. This suggests that we are likely to understate wage growth due to search in Germany relative to the US. This strengthens our argument that wage growth due to job search is of similar importance to German apprentices and for US high school graduates and dropouts.
Discussion and conclusion
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we propose a simple method of decomposing total wage growth into wage growth due to general human capital accumulation, firm-specific human capital accumulation, and job search. We provide a definition of wage growth due to job search, and state the assumptions under which lower and upper bounds for wage growth due to search and firm-specific human capital accumulation can be identified. In addition, we also outline a method for estimating wage growth due to general human capital accumulation. Second, we compare the sources of wage growth in two countries with very different labor market institutions, the United States and Germany. Our main findings can be summarized as follows. In both countries and for all education groups, general human capital accumulation is the most important source of wage growth. After ten years in the labor market, at least 60 % of total wage growth can be attributed to general human capital accumulation. Wage growth due to firm-specific human capital accumulation and deferred compensation is considerable for German unskilled workers, but negligible for all other education groups. Job search plays an important role for all education groups in both countries. Interestingly, wage growth due to job switching is roughly similar for German apprentices and for US high school dropouts and graduates. Our preferred explanation for this is that, due to higher firing costs in Germany, German workers are less likely to become unemployed. Thus, they are less likely to involuntarily lose accumulated search capital. We conclude by pointing out possible extensions for future work. First, we have ignored occupation-and industry-specific skills, as well as mobility across occupations and industries.
The importance of industry-specific human capital in the US has been stressed by Neal (1995) and Parent (2000) 34 . Kambourov and Manovskii (2002) argue that skills are mainly occupationspecific. Moreover, many firm switches may in fact involve occupation or industry switches. An interesting question is thus: How much of the wage growth due to search is due to workers finding a firm with which they are better matched, as opposed to an occupation for which they are better suited? Second, our decomposition of overall wage growth into wage growth due to general human capital, firm-specific human capital, and job search was done by actual experience, and not by potential experience. Future work should take into account the time German and US workers spend in unemployment and out of the labor force. Third, a natural next step is the structural estimation of a search model. This may allow us to answer questions that our more descriptive approach cannot answer, such as: How much worse off would workers be if they did not have the option to search on-the-job? Do the offer arrival probabilities differ for German and US workers or across education groups? etc.
Appendix
Appendix A: German data
The sample Apprentices are included in the sample if they completed the apprenticeship after 1979; if they have never worked in East Germany; and if they finished only one apprenticeship.
In case they had not completed A-levels (Abitur), they are included in the sample if they were not older than 15 in 1975 and at most 19 at labor market entry. In case they completed A-levels, they are included in the sample if they were not not older than 19 in 1975 and at most 21 at labor market entry. Unskilled workers are included in the sample if they have never worked in East Germany; if they were not older than 15 in 1975 and at most 19 at labor market entry in case they did not complete A-levels. In case they completed A-levels, they are included in the sample if they were not older than 19 in 1975 and at most 21 at labor market entry. University graduates are included in the sample if they never worked in Germany; and if they were not older than 23 in 1975 and at most 29 at labor market entry.
Definition of variables
Education There are two ways of defining an apprentice, through the position variable and through the education variable in the data set. The position variable does not distinguish between apprentices and interns. The education variable may classify a worker as unskilled even if he completed an apprenticeship. This may happen if a worker currently holds a job for which an apprenticeship degree is not required. We define an apprentice as a worker who is reported as a trainee in one company for at least 700 days, regardless of whether the education variable classifies him as a worker with or without a finished apprenticeship. In addition, we consider a worker who spent less than 700 days in an apprenticeship program as an apprentice if the work placement lasted at least 1 year (position variable) and he was employed as a worker with a completed apprenticeship in at least half of his jobs (education variable). We classify a worker as a university graduate if he held at least one job that classified him as a university or polytechnic graduate. Unskilled workers are workers who are neither classified as apprentices nor as university graduates.
Experience and tenure Actual experience is measured as weeks (divided by 52) spent in fulltime employment. Part time employment, time spent self-employed or working without pay, time spent unemployed, time as an apprentice, and time spent out of the labor force is not counted. Actual tenure is measured as weeks (divided by 52) spent in full-time employment with the same employer. We assume that both experience and tenure refer to the beginning of the employment spell. This has little impact on our results. For apprentices, experience and tenure is counted from apprenticeship completion onwards.
Wages Our wage variable is the daily average wage, deflated by the Consumer Price Index, using 1995 as the base year.
Wage observations used We next describe which wage observations are used in the analysis.
Our goal is to use wage observations one year apart in terms of actual experience. This is best illustrated with an example. Table 14 lists the number of firms the worker with identification number 210 worked for during the first year in the labor market. This particular worker changed jobs many times, and for each job, we observe the average daily wage he earned. We keep only two wage spells, the first spell at labor market entry, as well as the spell at which his actual experience exceeds 1 year for the first time. 
Appendix B: US data
The Sample We use wage spells after a transition from school to work only. Our definition for a transition from school to work is a combination of Lynch's (1992) and Farber and Gibbons' (1996) definition. Lynch (1992) defines the transition from school to work as the year in which the respondent was enrolled in school that was followed by at least two years not enrolled in school. Farber and Gibbons (1996) look at whether the respondent is classified as working or not. A worker is classified as working when he has worked at least 26 weeks, and during these weeks at least 30 hours, since the last interview. We follow this classification, with the only modification that we use calendar years instead of interview years. We do so because the time between two interviews varies from 9 to 40 months. According to Farber and Gibbons (1996) , a transition from school to work, or rather from non-work to work, takes place when the worker is classified as non-working for at least one year, followed by at least two consecutive years classified as working. Our definition takes the minimum of Lynch's and Farber and Gibbons' definitions.
Definition of variables
Education High school dropouts are workers without a high school diploma or GED. High school graduates are workers with a high school diploma (including GED), but no bachelor's degree.
High school graduates include college dropouts. College graduates are workers with at least a bachelor's degree.
Experience and tenure Actual experience is measured as weeks (divided by 52) spent in full-time employment after the transition from school to work. Part time employment, time spent as self-employed or working without pay, time spent unemployed, and time spent out of the labor force is not counted. Actual tenure is measured as weeks (divided by 52) spent in full-time employment with the same employer. We assume that experience and tenure refer to the end of each wage spell. This has little impact on our results.
Wages Our wage variable is the hourly wage rate computed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, deflated by the Consumer Price Index with 1995 as the base year. We drop unreasonable wage information. We consider a wage observation as unreasonable if the hourly wage rate is below 1 $ (this is well below the official minimum wage) and above 300 $. We also drop a wage spell if the hourly wage increases (decreases) by at least 300 % in one period, followed by a 300 % decrease (increase) in the next period.
Wage observations used Table 15 lists the number of firms the worker has worked for during the first three years in the labor market (identification number 36). For each employer he worked for, we observe the hourly wage rate. We keep only the first spell at labor market entry, as well as the spells at which his actual experience exceeds 1 (2,3 ..) years for the first time. Appendix C: The covariance structure of within-job wage growth residuals Separate regressions for each education group. Regressions control for the change in actual experience (and tenure), the change in experience squared and cubed, and time dummies.
